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Abstract 
In many cases commonsense knowledge consists of knowledge of what is 
usual. In this paper we develop a system for reasoning with usual 
information. This system is based upon the fact that these pieces of 
commonsense information involve both a probabilistic aspect and a granular 
aspect. We implement this system with the aid of possibility-probability 
granules. 
Introduction 
An ability to handle commonsense reasoning is a crucial need in the 
development of the artificial intelligence [1] . A number of variants of 
so-called non-monotonic logics have been introduced as aids in developing 
these commonsense reasoning mechanisms [2-41. 
Recently L. A. Zadeh has suggested that a central role in a theory of 
com,nonsense must be played by a concept of "usuality". This concept 
reflects the fact that in many cases commonsense reasoning involves 
reasoning with usual values for variables. For example, the statement 
"a cup of coffee costs fifty cents," 
is more precisely reflected by the statement 
"a cup of coffee usually costs fifty cents. " 
In a number of recent presentations Zadeh [5-7] has suggested some 
properties which must be present in any theory of usuality. In this paper 
we introduce a formal mechanism for representing and manipulating usual 
values. This formalism allows for both logical and arithmetic 
manipulations of usual values. The formal structure used to represent 
these usual values are Possibility-Probability granules <Poss-Prob 
granules>. These structures have been studied by Yager [8-10] and are 
based upon a combination of the linguistic variables introduced by L. A. 
Zadeh in his theory of approximate reasoning (11] and the evidential 
structures introduced by 6. Shafer [12] . 
As we shall see, the idea of usuality implies some random or 
probabilistic phenomenon at play as well as some idea of granularity. The 
idea of granularity necessitates the use of set theoretic constructs in the 
form of possibility distributions which enable us to account for the fact 
that humans conceptualize in terms of gross concepts. The introduction of 
the probabilistic aspect also provides a departure from the approach taken 
by the non-monotonic logicians. 
We further note that these usual values play a central role as default 
values in frames and other similar type structures [13-15] . 
Since much of the information in knowledge-based systems involves the 
use of commonsense knowledge. This theory of usuality will greatly impinge 
in· this area. 
On Possibility-Probability Granules 
In preparation for presenting our representation scheme for usual 
values we briefly review the idea of possibility-probability granules. For 
more details on these structures see (8-101. 
339 
Assume V is a variable which takes its value in the set X. Assume A is 
a fuzzy subset of X a canonical statement of knowledge about V is of the 
form V is A. A canonical statement is meant to be interpreted as a 
proposition indicating that the value of V lies in the subset A. These 
type of statements provide a restriction on the value of V. A canonical 
statement provides a formal way of representing many natural language 
statements. Consider the statement "Bill is young. " This can be 
represented as V is A where V would indicate the attribute Bill's age and A 
would be the subset of ages constituting the user's definition of young. 
Canonical statements of this type provide a mechanism for associating 
values to attributes when there exists some uncertainty as to the value of 
the attribute. In particular a canonical statement associates a set of 
possible values, those elements in the set A, with the variable V. We 
denote the type of uncertainty associated with these statements as 
possibilistic uncertainty. 
A more general data structure which subsumes these canonical statements 
is what we shall call a Possibility-Probability granule. Again assume V is 
a variable which takes its value in the set X. Let Ak, k = 1,2, •••••• • n, 
be a collection of fuzzy subsets on X. Again in this framework V is Ak is 
� c�nonical statement restricts the value of the v�riable V. However in 
this more general setting of Poss-Prob granules we allow for some 
probabilistic uncertainty as to which is the appropriate canonical 
statement restricting the value of v. In particular we associate with each 
statement V is Ak a probability pk, which indicates the probability that 
V is Ak is the appropriate proposition expressing our knowledge about V. 
We note that their exists no restriction on the relationship between the 
Ak's,other than they be non-null fuzzy subsets of X, however the pk's 
must sum to one. 
Care should be taken to understand that pk is not the probability that 
the value of an experiment on X results in an element in Ak but more in the 
following vain. There exists some other space Y =  <y&, Yzt •• •••• ,y"} in 
which we perform a random experiment in which pk is the probability that Yk 
is the outcome. If as a result of this experiment yk occurs then we say 
that V is Ak is the canonical statement restricting V. 
In [10] Yager has shown that the structure captured by these Poss-Prob 
granules is similar to that of a Dempster-Shafer belief structure in which 
the Ak's are the focal elements and the pk's are the weights. However, we 
note in this Poss-Prob framework the Ak's can be fuzzy subsets. Because of 
the similarity with the Dempster-Shafer belief structure we shall denote 
the knowledge that a variable's value is controlled by a Poss-Prob granule 
as 
V is m, 
where m is a basic probability assignment function <bpa> with focal 
elements {Ak> and weights m<Ak> = Pk• 
Two important concepts associated with Dempster-Shafer are the measures 
of plausibility and belief defined on subsets of X. Because of the 
allowance for fuzzy sets as focal elements we must provide more general 
definitions for these measures in the framework of Poss-Prob granules. For 
any subset B of X 
Pl<B> = �k <Poss[B/Akl * m(ak>> and Bel<B> = �k <Cert[B/Akl * m<Ak>>, 
where Poss[B/Akl = MaxM tB<x> A Ak<x>l and Cert[B/Akl = 1-Poss[B-/Akl • In 
the above B<x> and Ak<x> are membership grades of x in the respective sets 
and s- is defined by B-<x> = 1-B<x>. 
In [101 Yager has shown that when the focal elements are restricted to 
be crisp subsets of X these definitions collapse to those of Shafer. 
As is well established in the Dempster-Shafer setting these two 
measures provide bounds on the probabilities of events in the space X of 
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outcomes for V. In particular, if we denote Prob<B> ti indicate the 
probability that the value for V lies in the set B then 
Bel<B> � Prob<B> S Pl<B>. 
The use of Poss-Prob granules provides a very powerful mechanism for 
representing various different types of knowledge about the variable V in a 
unified structure. One particular type of knowledge we shall find useful 
in this paper is the case in which we know that Prob<B> is "at least a. " 
Formally this can be stated as a � Prob<B> S 1. Thus in this case we 
require that Bel<B> = a  and Pl<B> = 1. It can easily be shown that the 
least restrictive Poss-Prob granule which can represent this information is 
a bpa m on X such that m<B> = a and m<X> = 1-a. 
On Usual Values and Their Representation 
As we noted in a number of recent papers L. A. Zadeh has introduced the 
concept of usuality and discussed its central role in any theory of 
commonsense reasoning. In particular Zadeh argues that in many cases the 
types of knowledge which constitutes commonsense involves the knowledge 
about the usual value of some variable. Furthermore we understand Zadeh to 
suggest that in many cases these usual values are vague and imprecise of 
the type best represented by a linguistic value and the associated ideas of 
a fuzzy subset and a possibility distribution. This imprecision is due to 
the granular nature of human conceptualization. 
If V is a variable taking its value in the set X and A is a fuzzy 
subset of X representing the usual value of V, we could then say, 
"usually V is A" or equivalently U<V> is A, where U<V> denotes the usual 
value of V. Examples of the above of linguistic structure would be 
"usually basketball players are tall, " 
"usually birds fly" 
"usually Mary comes home at about 8 o'clock. 
In many instances of natural language discourse we suppress the word usually 
and simply say, for example, "birds fly" rather than "usually birds fly. " 
If one doesn't recognize this shorthand many difficulties follow. 
The statement "usually Mary comes home at 8 o'clock, " as formalized by 
Usually V is A embodies a number of different forms of uncertainty. We see 
that the statement U<V> is A implies some probabilistic phenomenon in our 
knowledge about the variable V. We shall now provide a formal framework 
for representing this type of knowledge. 
According to Zadeh the statement Usually V is A should be interpreted 
as indicating that the probability that the event A occurs as the value for 
the variable V is "at least a", where a is some number close to one. The 
usual the occurrence of A the closer a is to one. 
As we have indicated in the previous section this type of information 
on the variable V can be represented as a Poss-Prob granule. In particular 
the knowledge that usually V is A can be represented as the Poss-Prob 
granule 
V is m, 
where m is a bpa on X, the frame of V, such that m<A> = a and m<X> = 1-a. 
Thus we see that the effect of the statement usually V is A is to say 
that a portion of the time the value of V is determined by the proposition 
V is A and that for 1-a of the time V is unknown. 
The form V is m shall constitute a canonical type of representation 
for usual information. In the next section we shall provide for the 
translation of various linguistic structures involving usual values into 
these structures. 
Before preceding we note that a non-probabilistic assertion such as 
"John is about 30 years old" can be written in this formation as V is m1 
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where V is the attribute John's age and m�, is a bpa such that m�.<B> = 1 
where B is " about thirty. " 
Translation of Compound Statements 
In this section we shall provide some procedures for trans lating 
compound linguistic statements involving usual values into formal 
structures in terms of Poss-Prob granules. Our purpose here is to put 
these complex linguistic statements into forms which enable us to us e the 
sophisticated mechanisms available _for combining these structures as 
necessary in the course of the reasoning process. 
The approach here is based upon a generalization of the approach used 
in Zadeh's theory of approximate reas oning [111. 
We first start with the representation of linguistic structures in 
which propositions involving linguistic variables are qualified by the 
modifier " us ually. " 
Assume V is a variable taking values in the set X. We recall a 
statement of the form V is A, where A is a fuzzy subs et of X, is called a 
canonical propos ition. As we discus s ed in the previous section the effect 
of the qualification of this proposition by usually to Usually <V is A> is 
to trans form this statement into a Pos s -Prob granule of the form V is m* 
where m* is a bpa on X such that m<A> = a and m<X> = 1-a. 
As sume V�, and V:a are two variables taking their values in the sets X 
and Y respectively. Cons ider the conditional statement 
" if V�, is A then Vz is B, " 
where A and B are fuzzy subsets of X and Y respectively. From the theory 
of approximate reasoning, this conditional statement trans lates into 
compound canonical propositions <V�,, V:a> is H where H is a fuzzy subset of 
X x Y which can be defined by 
H<x, y> = Min [1, 1-A<x> + B<y>J. 
Alternatively H can be defined as H<x, y) = Max [1-A<x>, B<y>l. 
Now consider the qualified version of this statement "usually if V�, is A 
then V:a is B. " This can be seen to be equivalent to usually <V:.., V:z> is H 
which can be represented as any usuality qualified canonical proposition as 
a Poss-Prob granule <V1, V2) is m where m is a bpa on X x Y such that m <H> 
= a and m <X x Y> = 1-a. 
Consider now the statement us ually <V�, is A or V:z is B>. Since the 
statement V is A or V:z is B translates into the compound canonical 
proposition <V�,, Vz> is H* where H is a fuzzy s ubset of X x Y such that 
H*<x, y) = Max [A(x), B<y>J then the statement us ually <V�, is A or V:z is B> 
which is equivalent to us ually <V�,, V:a> is H* translates into the Poss-Prob 
granule <V�,, V:z> is m• where m• is a bpa on X x Y such that m*(H*> = a  and 
m*<X x Y>= 1-a. 
Similarly us ually <V�, is A and V:z is B> translates into <V�,, V:z) is m� 
where m� is a bpa on X x Y s uch that m�<H�> = a and m�<x x Y> = 1-a 
where H� is a fuzzy subs et of X such that H�<x, y> = Min [A<x>, B<y>J. 
In the above we have es sentially applied this new usuality 
qualification operation to statements which are canonical forms from the 
theory of approximate reas oning, ie. V is A or <V�,, V:z> is H. All the 
logical operations were performed on canonical s tatements before the 
usuality qualification trans formed them into granules . In the next section 
we shall look at situations in which we combine under various logical 
operations structures which are of the form of Poss-Prob granules . This 
will enable us to translate compound statements in which the usuality 
qualification is more deeply embedded in the structure. 
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Logical Translation Rules 
Let � be any operation definable in terms of operations on sets. Based 
upon the work of Yager [10] we can extend this operation to apply to 
Poss-Prob granules. Assume V1 is m1 and Vz is mz are two Poss-Prob defined 
over the sets X and Y respectively, the rule developed by Yager states that 
<V1 is m1> � <Vz is mz) translates into <V1, Vz> is m1 � mz 
where m = m1 � mz is a bpa defined on X x Y such that for all the focal 
elements Ak of m1 and B� of mz 
m<Ak � 8�) = m1<Ak> * mz<B�>. 
Equivalently we can define m such that for any A C X x Y 
m<A> = E m1<Ak> * mz<B�>, 
where the summation is taken over all Ak,B� such that Ak�B�= A. 
We note in the special case where V1 = Vz = V defined on X then 
<V is m1> � V is mz translates into V is m where m is a bpa on X defined as 
in the abovee Dempster's rule is a special case when � = 0. 
Let us use this rule to translate some linguistic statements which 
involve an embedded usuality qualification. 
Consider the statement "if V1 is A then usually Vz is B. " This 
statement can be seen to be of the form "if V1 is m1 then vz is m:z," where 
m1 is a bpa on X such that m1<A> = 1 and mz is a bpa on Y such that mz<B> = 
a and mz<Y> = 1-a. 
Applying our translation rule to this situation we get, <V1, Vz> is m 
whe�-e m <Ak � B� > = m1 <Ak> * mz <B� > and Ak � B� = Gk�. Gk� is a fuzzy subset 
of X x Y such that Gk�<x, y>= Min [1, 1-Ak<x> + B�<y>J. 
In the case we are interested in with A � B = D and A � Y = X x Y we 
get <V1, Vz> is m• where m• is a bpa on X x Y such that m*<D> = a and 
m*<X x Y> = 1-a. We note in this case D<x, y> = Min <1, 1-A<x> + B <y>>a 
Parenthetically we note that this is the same translation as the statement 
"usually if V1 is A then Vz is B. " 
Consider next the statement, "if usually V1 is A then V:z is B. " This 
can be translated into "if V1 is m1 then Vz is mz" where m1 is on X such 
that m1<A> = a  and m1<X> = 1-a. mz is on Y such that mz<B> = 1. 
Using our translation rule we get <V1,Vz> is m•. m• is a bpa on X such that 
m*<D> = a and m*<H> = 1-a in which D<x, y> = Min [1, 1-A<x> + B<y>J and 
H <x, y> = B <y>. 
Next consider the statement "if usually V1 is A then usually Vz is B. " This 
can be first translated as "if V1 is m1 then Vz is mz" where m1 is a bpa on 
X such that m1<A> = a  and m1<X> = 1-a and mz is a bpa on Y such that mz<B> 
= a and mz<X> = 1-a. 
Using our logical translation rule this becomes <V1, Vz> is m-, where 
m• is a bpa on X x Y such that m*<A � B> = a2, m*(A � Y> = a<1-a>, m*<X � 
B> = <1-a)a and m*<X � Y> = <1-a><1-a). Since A �  B = D, A �  Y = X � Y and 
X �  B = H, then m• can be seen to be m*<D> = a2, m*<H> = <1-a>a an d m*<X x ­
Y> = 1-a. 
Consider next the proposition "usually V1 is A and usually Vz is Be" 
Formally this becomes V1 is m1 and Vz is mz where m1 is a bpa on X such 
that m1<A> = a  and m1<X> = 1-a. mz is a bpa on Y where mz<B> = a  and 
m2<Y> = 1-a. This can be seen to be equivalent to <V1, Vz) is m• where m­
is on X x Y such that m*<D1> = a2, m*<Dz) = a(1-a>, m*<D3> = a<1-a> and 
m* (D4) = <1-a)2• In this structure D1<x,y> = Min<A<x>, B<y>>, Dz<x, y> = 
A<x>, �<x, y> = B<y> and D4<x, y> = 1. 
On the other hand "V1 is m1 or Vz is mz" becomes <V1,Vz> is m• where 
m•<D> = a2 and m•<X x Y> = 1-a2 where D<x, y> = Max [A<x>, B<y>J. 
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Reasoning With Usual Values 
In this section we shall look at the structure of some examples of 
reasoning with usual values. Consider the following two propositions 
P1: Usually [if V1 is A then Vz is Bl 
P:z: Vs. is C. 
In the above we are assuming that A and C are fuzzy subsets of X, the base 
set of Vs. and B is a fuzzy of Y, the base set of V:z. These two pieces of 
data can be written as Poss-Prob granules, 
Ps.: <Vs., V:z> is m1 and P:z: <V1> is m:z. 
In the above m1 is a bpa on X x Y such that m1<H> = a  and m1<X x Y> = 1-a 
where H<x, y> = (1-A<x>> v B<y>. m:z is a bpa on X such that m:z<C> = 1. 
Taking the conjunction o-f these two pieces o-f· data we get " (V1, V:z> is m::s" 
where m::s is a bpa on X x Y such that m::s<E> = a and m::s<E1> = 1-a where 
E<x, y) = H<x, y> A C<x> = ((1-A<x>> v B<y>> A C<x> 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
and E1<x, y> = C<x>. Finally to get the inferred value of V:z, V:z is m,., we 1 
take the projection of m::s on Y. Thus m,. is a bpa on Y such that m<F> = a 
and m<Fs.> = 1-a, where F1 = Projv E1 � Fs.<y> = Max" Es.<x, y> = 1, thus 
Fs. = Y. F = Projv E F<y> = Max" [(1-A(x)) v B(y)) A C(x). Thus the 
inferred information about V:z from Ps. and P:z is that usually V:z is F. 
We note that in the special case when A =  C we get F = Max" [(A-<x> A 
A<x>> v <B<y> A A<x>>. Furthermore if A is crisp then F = B. 
Consider next the situation in which both propositions involve usual 
values 
Ps.: Usually <if V is A then V:z is B> 
P:z: Usually <V is C>. 
I 
I 
In this case as in the previous case Ps.: <Vs., V:z> is ms. where m1 is the bpa I X x Y such that m1<H> = a  and m1<X x Y> = 1-a. However in this case on P:a: v is m� 
where m� is a bpa on X such that m�<C> = a and m�<X> = 1-a. 
Taking the conjunction of these two pieces of data we get 
<V1, V:z) is m� 
where m�<E> = a2, m�<H> = a  <1-a>, m�<C x Y> = a  <1-a) and 
<1-a)2• 
Finally we can infer that 
V:z is m� 
m�<X x Y> = 
where m� is a bpa on Y and its focal elements are obtained as the 
projection onto Y of the focal elements of m�. We note 
Projv [H] = Projv [C x Yl = Projv [X x Yl = Y. 
Since have already shown Proj [E] = F we get 
m:<F> = a2 and m�<Y> = 1-a2• 
Thus in this situation we have obtained <usually)• <V:z is F>. 
Consider the two Poss-Prob granules V:z is m. and V:z is m: where 
m,.<F> = a m:<F> = a2 
m.<Y> = 1-a m,.<Y> = 1-a2 
which were obtained as a result of the preceding reasoning processes. Let 
us look at the plausibility and certainty measures associated with some 
arbitrary subset A of Y under each of these granules. From our definitions 
Pl<A> = a  Poss [A/Fl + <1-a) Poss [A/Y] 
Pl*<A> = a2 Poss CA/Fl + <1-a2) Poss CA/Yl 
Since Poss [A/Y] � Poss [A/Fl and -for any a E CO, ll, a � a2 then it follows 
that Pl*<A> � Pl<A>. Furthermore 
Bel<A> = a  Cert [A/Fl + <1-a> Cert [A/Yl 
Bel*<A> = a2 Cert [A/Fl + (1-a2) Cert [A/Yl. 
Since Poss [A-/Yl � Poss [A-/Fl it follows that Cert [A/Fl � Cert [A/Yl. 
Hence Bel<A> � Bel*<A>. Thus we see_that the case of a usually qualified 
proposition provides tighter bounds on the probability of events then that 
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of a usually squared qualified proposition. 
Arithmetic Operations with Usual Operations 
In the preceding sections we have mainly concerned ourselves with the 
manipulation of usual values under logic operations. In many cases we may 
have to perform mathematical or arithmetic operations on these usual 
values. In this section we develop the calculus necessary to perform these 
operations. The ability to handle both logical and arithmetic 
manipulations provides this approach with a very sophisticated mechanism 
for building expert systems. 
Assume V1 and Vz are two variables taking their values in the real 
line R. Let V1 is m1 and Vz is mz be two Poss-Prob granules in which m1 
and mz are basic probability assignments on R. Let {Ak} be the focal 
elements of m1 and let {B�} be the focal elements of mz. We note that both 
the A's and B's are fuzzy subsets of R. Let "V = V1 .J. Vz" where .1. is any 
arithmetic operation, (addition +, subtraction -, multiplication *, 
division 1, or exponentiation >. In [101 Yager has shown that in this 
situation "V is m" where m is a bpa on R such that for any A C R 
m<A> = E m1<A1> * mz<B�>, 
where the summation is taken over all As and B� such that As.J.B�=A. 
In '<Jrder to evaluate the above we must use fuzzy arithmetic [171. In 
particular if E and F are two fuzzy numbers, fuzzy subsets of the real 
line, then E .1. F = 6, where 6 is a fuzzy subset of R such that 
6 = LJv.ac" {E(y) A F(z)/y .J. z}. 
Let us look at the situation for various forms of m1 and mz. 
Consider the case in which our knowledge is 
P1: Usually V1 is A and Pz: Vz is B 
in which A and B are fuzzy subsets of R. First we see that these two 
pieces of data can be represented in terms of granules in the following 
way. P1: V1 is m1 in which m1 is a bpa on R defined by m1<A> = a  and 
m1<R> = 1-a. Pz: Vz is mz where mz is also a bpa on R defined by mz<B> = 
1. If V = V1 .1. Vz then V is m where m is a bpa on R defined by m<A .J. B> = a 
and m<R .J. B> = 1-a. Since for any mathematical operation, except division 
by B = O, R .J. B = R we get m<A .J. B> = a and m<R> = 1-a, thus this 
translates to usually <V is A .J. B>. 
Consider next the situation in which both pieces of data involve usual 
values; P1: usually V1 is A and Pz: usually Vz is B. In this case we get V1 
is m1 and Vz is mz where m1<A> = mz<B> = a and m1<R> = m2(R) = 1-a. 
If V = V1 .J. Vz then V is m- where m-<A .J. B> = a2, m*<A .J. R> = a  <1-a>, 
m*<R .1. B> = <1-a) a and m-<R .J. R> = <1-a)2• However again since A .J. R = 
R .J. B = R .J. R = R we get m•<A .1. B> = a2 and m•<R> = 1-a2• Thus this 
translates into 
<usually)2 <V is A .J. B>. 
Conclusion 
We have presented a calculus for reasoning with usual valued 
knowledge. This system can provide a mechanism for implementing expert 
systems with commonsense knowledge. 
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